Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social
Justice
Volume 4

Issue 1

Article 15

Spring 4-1-1998

ROBINSON v. SHELL OIL COMPANY 117 S.Ct. 843, 136 L.Ed.2d
808 (1997).

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/crsj

Recommended Citation
ROBINSON v. SHELL OIL COMPANY 117 S.Ct. 843, 136 L.Ed.2d 808 (1997)., 4 Race & Ethnic Anc. L. J. 90
(1998).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/crsj/vol4/iss1/15

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and
Social Justice at Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice by an authorized editor of Washington
and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
christensena@wlu.edu.

ROBINSON v. SHELL OIL COMPANY
117 S.Ct. 843, 136 L.Ed.2d 808 (1997).

FACTS
Shortly after being fired by Shell Oil Company ("Shell")
in 1991, CharlesT.Robinson, Sr. filed a charge with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") claiming
discrimination based on race.' While that charge was being
processed, Robinson applied for another job.' Seeking an
employment reference, the company to which Robinson
had applied contacted Shell Robinson believed Shell provided a negative reference to the potential employer in
retaliation for filing a discrimination charge with the EEOC.
Robinson thereafter filed an antiretaliatory discrimination
charge against Shell with the EEOC and sued in the Federal
District Court for the District of Maryland 4 under § 704(a)
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.1 Section 704(a)
makes it unlawful for an "employer to discriminate against
any of his employees or applicants for employment"in retaliation for having taken advantage ofTitle VII's protections or
6
having assisted another in so doing.
Alleging that § 704(a) does not apply to retaliatory acts
against former employees, Shell filed, and was ultimately granted, a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted. 7 The District Court's decision to grant
the motion was consistent with Fourth Circuit precedent that
§ 704(a) did not apply to former employees.' On appeal to
the Fourth Circuit, the District Court was reversed by a divided panel of judges.9 Upon rehearing en banc, the Fourth
Circuit vacated its earlier decision and affirmed the District
Court's dismissal of the action." The Supreme Court granted
certior"due to conflicting decisions among the circuits."
HOLDING
Justice Thomas delivered the unanimous opinion of the
Supreme Court that the use of the word "employee" in §
704(a) includes former employees.According to the Court,
Congress's use of "employee" in § 704(a) was ambiguous. 2
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Without plain language to reveal whether the word"employee" included former employees, the Supreme Court turned
to the broader context and purposes of Title VII. 3 Finding it
more consistent with the broader context and purposes of
Title VII to interpret the term "employee" to include former
employees,
the Court reversed the decision of the Fourth
4
Circuit.

ANALYSIS/APPLICATION
Confronted with the damaging interpretation of §
704(a) by the Fourth Circuit, the Supreme Court secured
the effectiveness of Title VII's antiretaliatory provisions
by looking beyond the most literal interpretation of the
term "employee:" "A person in the service of another
under any contract of hire . .,15
'.. When attacking any
question of statutory interpretation, the Supreme Court
first inquires into any plain and unambiguous meaning of
the language. 6 Analysis of statutory language includes
examination of the language in question itself, the specific context in which the language is used, and the
broader context of the statute as a whole. 7 If, after scrutinizing the statutory language in accordance with these
three factors, the Court determines that the language is
clear, the inquiry must cease. When left with no clear
meaning, however, the Court, as in Robinson, then
endeavors to rule in a way that protects the purposes of
the statute. 9
I. STATUTORY ANALYSIS
A. The language itself

In its analysis of Robinson, the Court first questioned
20
the meaning of the term "employee" standing alone.
The Court recognized that the word "employee" refers to
the status of a relationship between one person and
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another," and, that the relationship is also judged with
respect to a point in time.When evaluating the point in
time against which the relationship is judged, the Court
gave no weight to the absence of a temporal qualifier
preceding the word "employee."" Although Congress
could have easily used the term "former employees" to
make it clear that the anitretaliation provisions protect
employees that have been discharged or have left the
employment voluntarily, its absence is not determinative
of Congress's intent.23 The Court noted that Title VII
never uses the words "former employees" or "current
employees," even where the specific context makes it
clear that one or the other is intended. 4 For example, the
Court held in Walters v. Metropolitan Educational
Enterprises,Inc., one month prior to Robinson, that the
word "employee" in § 701(b) 5 referred only to current
employees. 6 Section 701(b) limits the coverage of Title
VII to those employers that have "fifteen or more
employees for each working day in each of twenty or
more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year." 7 In determining that § 701(b) should be interpreted to mean fifteen or more employees on the payroll
for an entire week for twenty or more calendar weeks,
the Court implicitly referred to current employees.2 In
Robinson, the Court stated that even though the use of
the unqualified word "employees," has been used by
Congress to mean current employees, as in § 701(b) analyzed by the Walters case, it does not necessarily follow
that the term "employees" can only refer to current
2 9
employees.
B. The specific context in which the language is
used
Second, the Court examined the more immediate
context of the term "employee."The Court turned to the
statutory definition of "employee"3" and found that it also
did not indicate whether former employees are included
within the term. 3' Title VII defines an employee as "an
individual employed by an employer .... ,,32 The term
"employed" that is used in the statutory definition of
"employee" is defined by Black's Law Dictionary as
"[p]erforming work under an employer-employee rela-
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tionship."33 "Performing," as an action word, implies that
there is a current employment relationship. After taking
note of the definition of "employed" in Black's Law
Dictionary, the Court summarily stated that the word
"employed," as it is used in the statutory definition of
"employee,' could "just as easily be read to mean 'was
employed."'34
C The broadercontext of the statute as a whole
Third, the Court turned to the broader context of
Title VII as a whole and found that "employee" in some
contexts refers to current employees, but in other contexts the term was "more inclusive or different."3 Those
sections dealing with salaries and promotions, such as §
703(h), 36 for example, refer "unambiguously to a current
employee."3 7 That section allows an employer to provide
differing levels of compensation to employees based on
geography and a bona fide seniority or merit system. 38
Section 703(h) plainly refers to current employees
because compensation for services is only awarded to
employees that are currently employed.
Sections 706(g)(1) and 717(b), however, demonstrate
that the word "employee" can be used by Congress to
mean something more inclusive than current employee.
Both sections 39 authorize equitable actions by a court or
the EEOC including "reinstatement or hiring of employees."' "Employee" in sections 701(g)(1) and 717(b) must
include former employees and applicants for employment; only former employees can be "reinstat[ed]" and
only applicants for employment can be "hir[ed] ."
Section 717(b) also requires departments, agencies, and
units of the federal government to include in their
required equal employment opportunity plan a provision
"that an employee or applicant for employment shall be
notified of any final action taken on any complaint of discrimination filed by him ... "42 Since discriminatory dis3
charge is a prohibited "personnel action" under § 717(a),
the "employee" in § 717(b) to be notified is necessarily a
former employee.4 Section 717(c) goes on to give an
aggrieved "employee" the right to file a civil suit within
ninety days of notice of final action or within one hun-
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dred and eighty days of filing a charge with the department, agency, or unit.4 5 Again, since § 717(a) prohibits discriminatory discharge, the "employee" that has the right
to file a civil suit must be a former employee.
Section 701(c) 46 which defines "employment
agency" demonstrates that the term "employee" may be
used to mean something different than "current employee."47 "Employment agency" is defined as "any person regularly undertaking . . . to procure employees for an
employer or to procure for employees opportunities to
work for an employer.4 8 "Employees" is most logically
read to mean "prospective employees."49 In regards to
labor organizations, the term "employees" in § 701(e),"
which uses the same language as § 701(c), is also understood as "prospective employees.""
II. PROTECTING THE STATUTE
After reviewing these sections which established
that the term "employee" can mean either "current
employee," or something "more inclusive or different"
than "current employee," the Court noted that the
"examples at most demonstrate that the term ... may
have a plain meaning in the context of a particular section-not that the term has the same meaning in all
other sections and in all other contexts."52 Without any
clear understanding from the word itself, or its context,
the Court concluded that the term standing alone in §
704(a) must be ambiguous.53 Therefore, in each section
the term must be analyzed in its context to determine
54
whether the extent of its meaning is clear.
Here, the Court found that the context of § 704(a)
does not make it clear whether the term "employee" is
meant to include former employees. Section 704(a)
states: "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for
an employer to discriminate against any of his employees
or applicants for employment ... because he has ... made
a charge ... under this subchapter."55 The Court rejected
Shell's argument that the word "his" before "employee"
narrows the scope of the word to current employees.56
The Court stated that the "phrase 'his employees' could
include 'his' former employees, but could still exclude
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persons who have never worked for the particular
employer being charged with retaliation."' 7 The Court
also rejected the respondent's argument that the "inclusion in § 704(a) of 'applicants for employment' as persons distinct from 'employees,' coupled with its failure to
include 'former employees: is evidence of congressional
intent not to include former employees. The use of the
term 'applicants' in § 704(a) does not serve to confine, by
negative inference, the temporal scope of the term
'employees."""
Since the context of § 704(a) evidenced no plain
meaning of the term "employee:' the Court, in the interest of consistency and to protection of the spirit of §
704(a), held that the term includes former employees."9
This decision is consistent with the broader context of
Title VII that clearly intends to protect discharged
employees. 60 Because § 703(a) expressly prohibits discriminatory "discharge," it is only logical that former
employees claiming an act of discriminatory discharge
be protected by the antiretaliatory provisions of § 704(a)
for filing a charge with the EEOC. In addition, a decision
that the term "employees" does not include "former
employees" would topple the effectiveness of the antiretaliatory provision of Title VII. 6' Paraphrasing the EEOC's
amici curiae brief, the Court ultimately stated that the
"exclusion of former employees from the protection of
§
704(a) would undermine the effectiveness of Title VII by
allowing the threat of post-employment retaliation to
deter victims of discrimination from complaining to the
EEOC, and would provide a perverse incentive for
employers to fire employees who might bring Title VII
claims."62
CONCLUSION
After painstaking analysis of statutory language by
the Court, the decision in Robinson preserves the force
of Title VII's antiretaliatory provisions by holding that §
704(a) protects former employees from retaliatory
actions spurred by the former employee's use or cooperation with Title VII's discrimination laws. Perhaps creative legal argument by counsel was the source the
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Fourth Circuit's interpretation of § 704(a), but common
sense, more than any other reason, dictates the ultimate
result in Robinson. The extraordinary aspect of
Robinson is the hermetic exegesis the Court conducts to
reach its decision. Aware, perchance, that the word
"employee" does not mean to the average man a person
who no longer provides labor for compensation, the
Court felt compelled to prove beyond a reasonable

doubt that the word really is ambiguous.The most obvious reason for its decision, the purpose of the statute,
was given an almost cursory treatment. Legislative intent
is accorded secondary treatment to patent language, if
any. In Robinson, the Court reaches the right result, but
without enough emphasis on the right reason.
Summary and Analysis Prepared by:
Jennifer Schooley

